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Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine
in International Human Rights Law
Holning Lau*
I. INTRODUCTION: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
PERSISTENT OBJECTOR DOCTRINE IS DUE
The doctrine of the persistent objector ("the doctrine") limits the
enforceability of international laws. According to the doctrine, if a state
persistently objects to the development of a customary international law, it
cannot be held to that law when the custom ripens. Presently, persistent
objection is a valid defense unless the customary international law attains the
rare status of a peremptory norm or, as it is referred to in Latin, a jus cogens.
Under existing international law, only a handful of human rights norms qualify
asjus cogens,' leaving the large majority of human rights laws susceptible to the
persistent objector doctrine. This Comment argues that application of the
persistent objector doctrine to customary human rights law is undertheorized
and, consequently, misguided. This Comment proposes a reformulated doctrine
that would be less accessible as a defense against human rights violations.
At present, the persistent objector doctrine is widely accepted by
international law treatises, 2 but this acceptance has been somewhat blind.
Scholars rarely scrutinize the doctrine's theoretical foundation.3 For example, in
his oft-cited international law treatise, Ian Brownlie simply sidestepped this line
BA 2000, University of Pennsylvania; JD Candidate 2005, The University of Chicago.
1 For a discussion on the scope ofjus cogens norms, see Part I.A.
2 See, for example, Ian Brownlie, Principles ofPubic Intemational Law 10 (Oxford 5th ed 1998).
3 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law,
excerpted in Anthony D'Amato, ed, International Law Anthology 110-11 (Anderson 1994) ("Many
[commentators] report the existence of the persistent objector rule but with little explanation and
few supporting authorities."). Three of the few scholars who have analyzed the persistent objector
doctrine's theoretical foundation are Jonathan I. Charney, Anthony D'Amato, and Ted L. Stein.
However, none of them specifically examined the doctrine's compatibility with human rights law,
which is the central purpose of this Comment. See id at 110-15 (summarizing studies by Charney,
D'Amato, and Stein).
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of analysis, suggesting that such an inquiry is unnecessary. He stated: "Whatever
the theoretical underpinnings of the [persistent objector] principle [may be], it is
well recognized by international tribunals, and in the practice of states."4
Infrequent invocation of the persistent objector doctrine may explain the dearth
of theoretical discourse on the doctrine.5
A critical assessment of the persistent objector doctrine is due in light of
recent events. In 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
recognized the persistent objector defense in Domingues v United States.6 In
Domingues, the United States asserted a persistent objector defense against
allegations that its use of the juvenile death penalty violated customary
international law.' The Commission held that the United States could not assert
the defense in the specific case of Domingues because the juvenile death penalty's
proscription had attained the status ofjus cogens 8 however, the Commission did
give the defense a big nod by expressly recognizing its legitimacy as a matter of
law.9 In other words, the Commission confirmed that states can raise a persistent
objector defense against violations of human rights law, so long as the law has
not yet becomejus cogens.
Domingues v United States ushered in a new era. Although Domingues was the
first case in which the persistent objector defense was raised in response to a
human rights violation, it is unlikely to be the last. By expressly recognizing the
persistent objector doctrine, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has opened the door for other states to raise the defense in the future in
different human rights contexts. Furthermore, the fact that the United States has
exercised the persistent objector defense will likely embolden other states to
assert the defense because the United States serves as a world leader whose
4 Id.
5 In The Approach of the Different Drummer The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, Ted
L. Stein discusses the fact that states have rarely invoked the doctrine. See 26 Harv Ind L J 457,
459-63 (1985). He predicts, however, that invocation may become more frequent in the near
future due to changing interstate dynamics. See id at 463.
6 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Report No 62/02, Merits Case 12.285 (2002),
available online at <http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htm> (visited Mar 24,
2005).
7 Id at 14. See also Curtis Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and InternationalLaw, 52 Duke L J 485,
516-35 (2002) (describing and defending the American position including its persistent objector
argument).
a Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Report No 62/02, Merits Case 12.285, at 85
(cited in note 6).
9 Id at 48 ("[A] norm of international customary law binds all states with the exception of only
those states that have persistently rejected the practice prior to its becoming law.").
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examples other states often emulate.' ° Indeed, Domingues brings urgency to the
study of the persistent objector doctrine.
This Comment, which proceeds in five parts, critically assesses the
persistent objector doctrine and concludes that the doctrine's application to
human rights should be restricted. Part II provides background on the persistent
objector doctrine-its mechanics, its functional purposes, and its history. Part
III provides background on human rights law. It discusses the inherent tension
between human rights law's assumption of universality and the doctrine of
persistent objector. Part IV analyzes the applicability of the persistent objector
doctrine to international human rights law. It looks specifically at the doctrine's
two primary functions: preserving the role of consent and promoting
foreseeability. In its analysis, Part IV argues that neither of these two functions
would be unduly jeopardized by restricting the doctrine's applicability in the
human rights context. Thus, to preserve the universality of human rights law,
application of the doctrine should be restricted. Accordingly, Part V proposes an
alternative construction of the persistent objector doctrine, in which states may
only invoke the doctrine as a defense against human rights violations when the
ripeness of relevant customary international law is at issue.
I1. PERSISTENT OBJECTOR DOCTRINE: ITS UNDERPINNINGS
A. MECHANICS
Customary international law consists of two components: opiniojuris and
usage." Opinio juris refers to the psychological component of customary
international law. In order for an international norm to be deemed customary
law, the norm must be strong enough such that states believe that the norm is
strong enough to be compelling law; this belief manifests in opiniojuris.'2 Usage
refers to the behavioral component of customary international law. It requires
that a critical mass of states acknowledge the psychological component and
actually implement the norm, in order for the norm to become law.
As one might gather, international norms develop over time; they do not
simultaneously emerge and become law. During a norm's gradual emergence,
10 See Stein, 26 Harv Intl LJ at 463-64 (cited in note 5) (suggesting that if "highly visible and legally
conscious states" raise the persistent objector defense, "[t]heir resort to the principle of the
persistent objector will tend to popularize and legitimize invocation of the principle.")
11 For background on the two components of customary international law, see generally Barry E.
Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, eds, International Law 134-46 (Aspen 3d ed 1999).
12 Black's Law Dictionagy (West 8th ed 2004) defines opiniojutis as the "principle that for conduct or a
practice to become a rule of customary international law, it must be shown that nations believe
that international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the conduct or practice."
Summer 2005 497.
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some states may object to the norm attaining legal status. According to the
persistent objector doctrine, these objectors shall be exempt from the norm after
it becomes law, so long as the state can rebut the assumption that it acquiesced
to the norm and prove that, instead, it exercised clear and consistent objections
throughout the norm's emergence.13 However, due to limited case law, the
definitions of "objection" and "consistent" are unsettled questions; states'
evidentiary burden to prove those elements is also unclear.
14
The only exceptions to the persistent objector doctrine are cases involving
jus cogens.15 Jus cogens are a vague subset of norms deemed by the international
community to be so important that absolutely no derogation from them will be
tolerated. 6 Courts and scholars usually determine whether a norm is jus cogens
based on qualitative, descriptive analyses. Currently, only a small number of
human rights norms are consideredjus cogen, they include proscriptions of only
the most egregious acts such as genocide, slavery, and torture. 17 Thus, many
human rights advocates may find that, due tojus cogens' under-inclusiveness, the
jus cogens exception is narrow and the application of the persistent objector
defense to human rights offenses is overly broad.
B. FUNCTIONALITY
In order to determine whether the persistent objector doctrine should
apply to human rights law, one should consider what functional purposes the
doctrine serves and whether those functions are compatible with human
rights law. A close look at the doctrine suggests that it serves two functional
13 Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Anaytical
Framework, 2 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 147, 150-51 (1996).
14 Id at 154 ("The form of the objection, how consistent it must be, and to what types of customary
law it applies, all remain open questions.').
15 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Report No 62/02, Merits Case 12.285, at 49
(cited in note 6). Black's Law Dictionary (cited in note 12) defines jus cogens as "A mandatory or
peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the international
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." However, it is unclear how and
when a norm becomes jus cogens. See generally James S. Gifford, Note, Jus Cogens and Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities: A Framework of Substantive, Fundamental Human Rights in a
Conslitutional Safe-Harbor, 16 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 481 (1999).
16 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 53, UN Doc A/Conf 39/27 (1969).
17 See Loschin, 2 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 162-63 (cited in note 13) (noting that, "[a]t this time,
there are few human rights norms that clearly fit within [thejus cogens] category"); Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 cmt n (1987) (enumerating a notably short list of human
rights norms that are peremptory: prohibition on genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or
causing disappearance, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and
consistent pattern of gross human rights violations).
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goals in international law: (1) preserving the role of consent and (2) providing
foreseeability.
Among the limited literature on the persistent objector doctrine, most
commentators note that the doctrine serves the primary function of
safeguarding the role of consent in international law. 8 According to its
traditional conceptualization, international law derives from agreement among
sovereign states. Thus, traditional theorists assert that states are only bound by
international laws to which they have agreed to be bound. These theorists point
out that there is no international legislature to impose laws, and accordingly,
international law must be borne out of consent among equally sovereign states.
According to these theorists, the persistent objector doctrine is a natural
component of the consent-based international system.
A secondary and less discussed function of the doctrine is to provide
foreseeability in international law.' 9  The process by which customary
international law emerges is an amorphous one. As mentioned above, opiniojuris
and usage combine to create customary international law, but the question of
when these two elements merge and ripen is often unclear. There is no
centralized international agency that issues a declaration every time a customary
international law ripens. Thus, it is difficult to pinpoint the date on which any
customary law ripens.2 ° As a result, without the persistent objector doctrine,
states that oppose the formation of an international norm might find themselves
liable for violating an international law without much forewarning. If the process
by which customary law ripens is so amorphous, how do states know when to
stop objecting and when to start complying with an international norm? In light
of this question, the persistent objector doctrine serves an important function-
it prevents the subjection of states to unforeseen liabilities.
C. HISTORY
The history of the doctrine is rather thin. Prior to Domingues, the doctrine
had only been recognized by an international tribunal on two other occasions.2'
18 See, for example, Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am J Ind L 529, 541 (1993)
("All arguments supporting the persistent objector rule are based on the view that international
law is the product of the consent of states.")
19 Consider Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule at 113 (cited in note 3) (noting that states are most
likely to invoke the doctrine when the ripeness of a customary international law is unclear).
20 See Charney, 87 Am J Intl L 536-39 (cited in note 18) (discussing why "it is difficult to fix the
precise date at which any customary law norm is established.").
21 Ted L. Stein's article from 1985 notes that the Aylum Case and the Fisberies Case were the only
source of international case law to recognize the persistent objector doctrine. See Stein, 26 Harv
Ind L J at 459 (cited in note 5). Two consolidated cases, Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and
Federal Republic of Germany v the Netherlands (North Sea Continental Shef Cases), 1969 ICJ 3 (Feb 20,
Summer 2005
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Those two cases are Colombia v Peru (the Asylum Case)22 and United Kingdom v
Nonvay (the Fisheries Case)23-both of which were adjudicated by the
International Court of Justice ("ICj"). It is notable that in both cases, the ICJ's
recognition of the persistent objector doctrine was purely dictum and the ICJ
had resolved the disputes on other grounds.24 Even more notably, neither the
Aylum Case nor the Fisheries Case addressed human rights law. The Asylum Case
addressed whether Peru's repudiation of a treaty's asylum provision amounted to
persistent objection.25 The Fisheries Case addressed whether Norway's repeated
opposition to the demarcation of a fishing zone amounted to persistent
objection.26 As discussed below in Part III, invoking the persistent objector
doctrine in the human rights context creates a unique tension worth discussing.
Neither the Asylum Case nor the Fisheries Case discussed this unique tension and,
therefore, their persuasiveness as precedents is limited.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: ITS ASSUMPTIONS
The international human rights regime is grounded in an assumption that
human rights are universal; 27 that is to say, a single human rights standard should
apply across the globe, transcending cultural, social, and political lines.28 After all,
the bedrock of the UN human rights regime lies in an instrument called the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR".29 States reaffirmed the
universalism embodied in the UDHR in the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human
1969), indirectly hinted at the persistent objector doctrine by noting the importance of
recognizing state objections. See, for example, id at 26-27. See also Brownlie, Principks of Pubc
InternationalLaw at 10, nn 50-51 (cited in note 2) (citing the Asylum Case, the Fisheries Case, and the
North Sea Continental Sbelf Cases as support for the persistent objector doctrine).
22 Colombia v Peru (Asylum Case), 1950 ICJ 266 (Nov 20, 1950).
23 United Kingdom v Norway (Fisheries Case), 1949 ICJ 116 (Dec 18, 1951).
24 Stein, 26 Harv Intl LJ at 460 n 7 (cited in note 5).
25 Asylum Case, 1950 ICJ at 275-78.
26 Fisheries Case, 1949 ICJ at 131.
27 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 187
(Oxford 1996) (noting that instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which form the foundation of the human
rights regime, "purport to give a genuinely universal expression" to the liberal foundation of
human rights law).
28 Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 Buff Hum Rts L
Rev 211, 211 (1999) (noting that universalism assumes that human rights principles "transcend
culture, society, and politics.")
29 Many jurists now regard the UDHR as customary international law. See Steiner and Alston,
International Human Rights in Context at 41 (cited in note 27) (explaining the status of the UDHR).
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Rights.3" By definition, universalism means that exceptions will not be made for
individual states. Indeed, the late Professor Jonathan I. Charney noted that, in
the wake of World War II, members of the United Nations sought to create a
human rights regime that "incorporated the principle that universal rules may be
established from which no derogation is permitted."31 In recent decades, there
has been debate over whether there should be cultural exceptions to the
assumption of universalism; however, despite this debate, the cultural relativist
position remains a minority position and the human rights regime remains
resoundingly universal in practice.32
The human rights regime's universalist assumption is at odds with the
effects of the persistent objector doctrine. By allowing individual states to
exempt themselves from international human rights law, the human rights
regime's universalist nature is necessarily compromised. To clarify the scope of
this Comment, it is worth noting that the assumption of universality is particular
to human rights law and not to other areas of international law. Thus, the
persistent objector doctrine may very well be compatible with some areas of
international law, but not the human rights context.
IV. ANALYSIS: MISAPPLICATION OF THE PERSISTENT
OBJECTOR DOCTRINE
Given the tension between the persistent objector doctrine and the
theoretical foundation of human rights law, one is left to ask whether the
doctrine should apply at all in human rights cases. This Part argues that, based
on the doctrine's functional purposes, the doctrine should not be broadly
applied in the human rights context.
A. THE NON-ABSOLUTE AND DIMINISHING ROLE OF CONSENT
The doctrine's first functional purpose is to preserve consent. Indeed, the
international legal system was developed around principles of consent.
However, those principles have never been absolute. Furthermore, the legal
system is evolving in such a way that the role of consent in public international
law is diminishing.
30 UN OHCHR, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), available online at
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/vienna.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2005).
31 Charney, 87 Am J Ind L at 543 (cited in note 18).
32 See generally Holning Lau, Comment, Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universalioy of International
Human Rights Law, 71 U Chi L Rev 1689, 1695-98 (2004) (discussing the current state of the
universalist versus cultural relativist debate).
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In 2004, Paul W. Kahn aptly described the diminishing role of consent in
public international law.
[I]n the classical era of international law, the state's commitment to a
conception of domestic sovereignty as unbounded authority led to an
international legal order organized around the principles of nonintervention
and consent. Today, pressure is in the opposite direction: Recognition of
state interdependence is pushing toward a reconceptualization of the
meaning of domestic sovereignty. 33
In the past half-century, there has been a growing number of instances in
which notions of consent were overridden-instances when international law
was imposed on states despite their lack of consent. An early example of the
diminishing role of consent comes from the decolonization period. The
international community held newly independent states to already-established
international law despite those states' frequent objections. Although the
emerging states did not consent to many existing laws, they still became bound
by them.
34
More recent illustrations of the diminishing role of consent involve
jurisdiction. For example, foreign states have not necessarily consented to
American jurisdiction; nonetheless, the United States' Alien Tort Claims Act35
allows non-Americans to sue foreign leaders in American courts for violations of
customary international law.36 Moreover, the concept of universal jurisdiction,
albeit controversial,37 has garnered support from a significant number of courts
33 Paul W. Kahn, TheQuestion of Sovereigny, 40 Stan J Intl L 259, 259 (2004). See also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Sovereigny and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 Stan J Ind L 283, 283 (2004)
("Theorists, pundits, and policymakers all recognize that traditional conceptions of sovereignty
are under assault."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 Tex L Rev 1989, 1992 (2004) ("International law is moving away from
a foundation of state consent and towards majoritarianism.").
34 Stein, 26 Harv Ind LJ at 467 (cited in note 5).
35 28 USC § 1350 (2003).
36 To a degree, the Alien Tort Claims Act preserves principles of consent because it only provides a
cause of action for violations of international norms that are clearly defined and accepted by
enough states to be considered "specific, universal, and obligatory." However, the Alien Tort
Claims Act undermines principles of consent because even if states consent to an international
norm, they have not necessarily consented to allowing the United States federal courts to
adjudicate claims involving that norm. See Sosa v AlvareZ-Macbain, 124 S Ct 2739 (2004)
(upholding the Alien Tort Claims Act as a tool for non-Americans to sue foreign leaders for
violations of "specific, universal, and obligatory" international human rights norms); Patrick
Curran, Comment, Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customay International Law, 5
Chi J Intl L 311 (2004) (providing background on the Alien Tort Claims Act).
37 For a criticism of universal jurisdiction, see Henry Kissinger, The PiOfalls of UniversalJurisaction, 80
Foreign Aff 86 (2001).
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and academics.3" Essentially, the concept of universal jurisdiction states that
certain violations of human rights law are so egregious that they can be tried
anywhere in the world under international law, regardless of whether the parties
to the case have consented to the forum. The trend towards universal
jurisdiction suggests a diminishing role for consent and, inversely, an increasing
emphasis on universality in international law.39
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF ORIGINAL CONSENT
Because the role of consent in international law is evolving and unclear,
international lawyers should not blindly accept the argument that principles of
consent necessitate the persistent objector doctrine. This Comment recognizes
that consent does play an important role in international law, but the question is:
to what degree?
This Comment argues for a new interpretation of consent in human rights
law, which it shall call the principle of original consent. The principle is as follows:
As discussed in Part II, it is well understood that states built the UN human
rights regime on assumptions of universalism.4" The UDHR and the Vienna
Declaration embody states' informal consent to the inextricable universality of
human rights law. Participation in the UN human rights regime-which grew
out of the UDHR-should itself be considered an informal expression of
consent to the regime's underlying assumption of universalism. Thus, if a state
participates in the UN human rights regime but later requests to excuse itself
from a specific human rights law because of its objections during the specific
law's emergence, that request should be refused. Principles of consent are not
violated because that state already consented to the universality of human rights.
Requesting an exception would be in violation of its original consent to
universalism. It is true that the state's original consent to universalism was
informal. Notably, the UDHR and the Vienna Declaration are not binding
treaties. Nonetheless, considering the tension between human rights law and the
persistent objector doctrine, legal theorists should treat these declarations as
38 See Richard H. Steinberg, UniversalJurisdiction: Issues Raised by Competing Theories, 8 UCLA J Ind L &
Foreign Aff 41, 43 (2003) (noting that "most commentators and many courts" claim that there is
a legal basis for universal jurisdiction).
39 See Temple Fett Kearns, Breaking the Shackles of the Past: The Role and Future of State Sovereigny in
Today's International Human Rights Arena, 25 Nova L Rev 501, 522 (2001) ("[T]he expansion of the
acts subject to universal jurisdiction . . . indirectly chips away at [the] concept [of sovereignty]
without the direct consent of the state itself.")
40 The original building block of the UN human rights regime is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which many scholars now believe to be customary international law. See note 29.
Members of the UN human rights regime reiterated their commitment to universalism in the
1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (cited in note 30).
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persuasive evidence of consent when they rethink the applicability of the
persistent objector doctrine to human rights law.
By applying the persistent objector doctrine to human rights law, theorists
are essentially creating a second layer of consent that impedes the enforcement
of human rights law. Moreover, this second layer is doctrinally unsound:
requiring a second layer of consent to specific human rights laws controverts
states' broad-yet significant-original consent to the human rights regime.
Simply put, by the time a specific human rights norm attains the status of
customary law, all states within the human rights regime have already consented
informally to that law's universality ex ante because they understood that
universalism undergirds the human rights regime.
Clearly, the principle of original consent is a loose interpretation of
consent. However, accepting that original consent is a theoretical principle rather
than a formal legal agreement, jurists should still consider the persuasive weight
of original consent. Why should legal theorists replace the current bi-layered
interpretation of consent with an original consent interpretation, insofar as
human rights are concerned? First, as noted above, the role of consent is not
absolute; thus, there is no doctrinal requirement for a strict interpretation of
consent. Second, the trend in international law militates towards reducing the
role of consent in international law. This trend suggests that the persistent
objector doctrine's strict interpretation of consent is somewhat anachronistic.
Third, over the years, a number of legal philosophers have waged normative
arguments against the role of consent in international law. 4 Thus, rethinking the
role of consent may be due. In light of these current dynamics, the original
consent theory is persuasive.
One could argue that a new understanding of consent is unnecessary
because the persistent objector doctrine, as it stands today, already recognizes
that principles of consent are not absolute. At present, the persistent objector
doctrine provides for the jus cogens exception. Unfortunately, the jus cogens
exception has its weaknesses. Most notably,jus cogens norms are under-inclusive.
Very few human rights norms attain jus cogens status.42 In effect, the jus cogens
exception creates a two-tiered system with bottom-tier human rights and an
upper tier, thejus cogens, which are absolutely non-derogable human rights. This
system is under-inclusive to only exceptjus cogens from the persistent objector
41 See Brian D. Lepard, Is the United States Obf'gated to Drive on the Rigbt? A Multidisciplinaty Inquiry into
the Normative Authoriy of Contemporay International Law Using the Arm's Length Standard as a Case
Study, 10 Duke J Comp & Intl L 43, 109 (1999) ("[T]heorists question whether consent alone
constitutes a necessary or sufficient normative justification for government or the authority of
international law.").
42 See note 17.
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defense because all, not just some, human rights are grounded in an assumption
of universalism. For example, commentators have noted that certain children's
rights and certain indigenous peoples' rights have ripened into customary
international human rights law.43 Like all human rights, these rights are
considered universal, even though they are notjus cogens.4
Another weakness of the jus cogens exception is the fact that jus cogens are
amorphous entities that are subject to discretionary interpretation.45 Some
commentators have criticized the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for discretionarily labeling the ban on juvenile executions as jus cogens.46
Arguably, the Commission overextended its discretion and overstretched legal
reasoning by equating the ban on juvenile death penalty with otherjus cogens such
as genocide. The Commission could have avoided its questionable legal
reasoning by employing instead an original consent argument. Rather than
straining the scope of the term jus cogens, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights could have more simply acknowledged that the United States had
previously consented to the universality of human rights.4 7  Thus, the
Commission could have reasoned that the persistent objector defense should
not apply because it would controvert that original consent. In other words, the
United States' consent to the universality of human rights laws should override
its lack of consent to a specific law during the law's formation.
C. FORESEEABILITY: BECOMING A NON-ISSUE
As noted above, preservation of foreseeability is another functional
purpose of the persistent objector doctrine. This function, however, is
increasingly becoming unnecessary due to the rise of international litigation.
43 Melissa Tortes, Note, Labor Rights and the ATCA: Can the ILO's Fundamental R'ghts Be Supported
through ATCA Litigation?, 37 Colum J L & Soc Probs 447, 460-62 (2004) (discussing children's
labor rights); S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the
Mulicultural State, 21 Ariz J Intl & Comp L 13, 14-16 (2004) (discussing indigenous peoples'
human rights).
44 Tortes, 37 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 460 (cited in note 43) (describing children's human right to
minimum labor standards as "universally binding customary international law"); Anaya, 21 Ariz J
Intl & Comp L at 20 (cited in note 43) (explaining the universal nature of indigenous peoples'
rights).
45 See generally James S. Gifford, 16 Ariz J Ind & Comp L at 481 (cited in note 15).
46 See, for example, Bradley, 52 Duke LJ at 537-38 (cited in note 7).
47 The United States' consent to universality is evinced by its rhetoric and conduct throughout the
past half century. See generally Curran, 5 Chi J Ind L at 316 (cited in note 36) ("the United States
traditionally adopts an avowedly universalist stance" on human rights laws); Mark Weston Janis,
International Law as Fundamental Justice: James Brown Scott, Harold Hong/u Kob, and the American
Universalist Tradition oflnternational Law, 46 St Louis U L J 345 (2002) (discussing the long tradition
of universalist thinking in the United States).
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It is true that customary international laws still ripen at varying paces and it
is difficult to identify exactly when a customary international law has ripened.
However, the rise of international litigation mitigates this problem. When
customary law is unclear, international case law serves as a subsidiary source of
law.48 Thus, after an international tribunal has held that a certain norm has
attained the status of customary international law, states should be on notice that
the customary international law has ripened. In other words, international case
law adds an element of foreseeability to international law.
Commentators have taken note of this rise in international litigation,
especially in the realm of human rights litigation.49 With the rise of international
litigation, a growing body of international case law has developed. Accordingly,
foreseeability becomes increasingly a non-issue. In the past, the persistent
objector doctrine provided a safety net for states. A state that objected to the
formation of an international law may not have known when it should stop
objecting and when to begin accepting the fact that a customary law had ripened.
Thus, the doctrine prevented unforeseen liability. However, the rise of
international case law reduces this foreseeability concern. As a result, the role of
the persistent objector doctrine should be modified to suit the times.
V. RECONCEPTUALIZATION:
LIMITING THE DOCTRINE'S APPLICATION
Considering the inherent tension between the persistent objector doctrine
and the universality of human rights law, jurists should not blindly apply the
doctrine to the human rights context. In light of the diminishing role of
consent in international law, the argument that the doctrine must be applied to
preserve consent in international law is questionable. The consent argument
becomes even less compelling when we consider states' original consent to
human rights laws' universality. Thus, the only true function that the doctrine
still serves is the preservation of foreseeability in the limited number of cases
where the ripeness of a customary human rights law is at issue. Accordingly,
invocation of the persistent objector defense should be limited to such cases
where ripeness is at issue.
48 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat 1055, TS No 933, art 38(1)(d), available
online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm> (visited Mar
24, 2005) (listing subsidiary sources of international law). See also Diane P. Wood, Diffusion and
Focus in International Law Scholarshp, I Chi J Intl L 141, 143 (2000) ("Public international lawyers
point to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") for a definitive list
of... source[s of international law]").
49 See, for example, Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429
(2003) (discussing the growing role of litigation in public international law).
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According to commentators, proscription of female genital mutilation
("FGM"), non-systematic types of racial discrimination, and employment
discrimination on the basis of gender are all examples of international norms
that are emerging but have not fully ripened."0 It is unclear if and when exactly
these norms will ripen into customary international laws. Thus, states objecting
to the norms will have no notice when they should stop objecting and start
complying with the new customary international laws. In these areas of law,
ripeness is at issue.
The remainder of this Part discusses this Comment's reformulation of the
persistent objector doctrine: limiting the doctrine to cases where a customary
international law's ripeness is at issue. First, this Part uses a case study on FGM
to examine how the reconceptualized doctrine would play out in individual cases
of human rights litigation. Afterwards, it considers how the reconceptualized
doctrine would impact international law more broadly. For example, this Part
will consider how this Comment's proposed version of the doctrine would affect
treaty law and the concept ofjus cogens.
A. APPLYING THE RECONCEPTUALIZED DOCTRINE
Examining a hypothetical case involving Mauritania and FGM sheds light
on how the reconceptualized doctrine would affect human rights litigation.
Currently, the African Union is establishing an African Court on Human
Rights.51 In the future, a state like Mauritania-in which approximately 95
percent of particular ethnic groups' girls undergo FGM-may be brought to
the court on the issue of FGM.12 Mauritania can try to argue that the ban on
FGM is not yet customary international law and alternatively, even if the norm
has ripened, it has been a persistent objector. If the court finds that the norm
against FGM has ripened, it should recognize Mauritania's persistent objector
50 See Beth Ann Gillia, Comment, Female Genital Mutilation: A Form of Persecution, 27 NM L Rev
579, 589 (1997) ("[Tlhe practice of States is currently not sufficiently consistent and wide-
spread to constitute a norm of customary international law."); Courtney W. Howland, The
Challenge of Relgious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equaiy Rights of Women: An Anaysis Under
the United Nations Charter, 35 Colum J Transnad L 271, 334 n 274 (1997) ("It is unclear whether
non-systematic racial discrimination violates customary international law."); Jo Lynn Southard,
Protection of Women's Human Rights under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discinination Against Women, 8 Pace Ind L Rev 1, 21-22 (1996) (noting that international
practice is too inconsistent to render women's rights as part of customary international law.).
51 See Agence France Presse, Protocol Establishing African Court on Human Rights Comes into Force 0an
25, 2004).
52 Mauritania has ratified the protocol establishing the African Court of Human Rights. Id.
Approximately 95 percent of Mauritanian girls of Soninke and Halpulaar ethnicity undergo FGM.
Amnesty International, Female Genital Mutilation in Africa: Information by County, available online at
<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm9.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2005).
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defense because, prior to the case, Mauritania persistently objected53 to
banning FGM and there had been no definitive holding that FGM is
proscribed by customary international law. In other words, Mauritania
persistently objected and it had no notice that it should have ceased objecting
to the developing norm and begin complying.
Our hypothetical case would serve as notice to all other states under the
jurisdiction of the African Court of Human Rights. Thus, under the
reconceptualized construction of the persistent objector doctrine, the defense
would not be valid against an FGM claim for any other African state because
foreseeability would no longer be an issue. Furthermore, if another petitioner
were to bring a second case against Mauritania in the future, Mauritania would
not be allowed to reinvoke the persistent objector defense, as long as enough
time had passed for Mauritania to begin reforms, because it was put on notice by
its first FGM case.
One might query whether there exists any practical difference between (1)
holding Mauritania in violation of FGM norms and (2) holding Mauritania
temporarily excused because it had no forewarning of the ripened norm, but
requiring Mauritania to reform and comply anyway. There is indeed a significant
difference. The human rights system is largely grounded in theories of
socialization. Labeling a human rights violator as such is in and of itself a
punishment because it diminishes the state's reputation, and thus, its soft
power.54 By recognizing that Mauritania has a valid defense, while still
compelling it to comply in the future, a court inflicts less severe damages upon
Mauritania's human rights record.
53 The evidentiary burden for establishing a persistent objection defense is unclear. See note 14.
However, one can reason that Mauritania can satisfy the definition of a persistent objector. In
international negotiations, Mauritania has objected to regulation of Islamic practices (such as
FGM) by lodging treaty reservations when it signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. See
United Nations Population Fund, Mauritania, available online at
<http://www.unfpa.org/adolescents/opportunities/mauritania/mauri-npr.html> (visited Mar
24, 2005) (summarizing Mauritania's ratification of relevant treaties). Mauritania has also refused
to sign the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. African Union, Status of the
Ratification of the Charter, available online at <http://www.africa-union.org/child/home.htm>
(visited Mar 24, 2004). Furthermore, Mauritania has no laws proscribing FGM. Amnesty
International, Female Genital Mutilation in Africa: Information by Country (cited in note 52). Thus,
Mauritania has no domestic laws that would jeopardize the consistency of its objector claim.
54 See Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International Institutions, 97
Am Socy Intl L Proc 301, 303 (2003) ("Transnational human rights advocacy networks promote
socialization through adverse international publicity about a state's violations of human rights;
noncompliance thus leads to embarrassment or damage to reputation. Moreover, once a state's
human rights misconduct has been exposed, more damaging bilateral or multilateral enforcement
may follow.").
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B. SITUATING THE DOCTRINE IN EXISTING LAW
While the case study on Mauritania illustrates how the reconceptualized
doctrine would play out in specific cases, it leaves open questions on how the
reconceptualized doctrine would affect international law more broadly. This
subsection considers some of these remaining questions.
First, one might query how this Comment's proposed version of the
doctrine would affect treaty law, specifically treaty reservations. To address that
inquiry, one must understand treaty law and its relation to customary
international law. Presently, customary international law trumps treaty law.
When principles in a treaty attain the status of customary international law, those
principles become universal, extending to states who were not signatories of the
treaty.55 By reconceptualizing the persistent objector doctrine, this Comment
simply extends that logic to treaty reservations by equating treaty reservations
with decisions not to sign specific provisions of a treaty. Presently, states can use
treaty reservations as evidence of their objection to make a persistent objector
claim and to excuse themselves from a customary international law even after it
ripens. Under the reconceptualization, a state can use treaty reservations to make
a persistent objector claim, but only until the relevant customary international
law clearly ripens. In other words, signatories to a treaty can still use a
reservation to excuse themselves from a particular treaty term, but only until the
reservation is trumped by customary international law.56
Second, one might also ask whether the reconceptualized version of the
persistent objector doctrine essentially collapses customary international human
rights law and jus cogens. It does not. Jus cogens norms may never be derogated.
However, states may derogate customary international law under a limited
number of circumstances-for example, under national security emergencies."
55 See Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Colum L Rev 1110,
1127 (1982) ("]reaties containing generalizable principles of international law generate rules of
customary international law that bind even non-signatories.").
56 It is unclear how reducing the power of treaty reservations would affect states' decisions to
commit to any given treaty in the first place. This Comment hypothesizes that states would still
experience considerable pressure-from other states, from non-governmental organizations, and
individuals-to commit and comply with human tights treaties. For a discussion of the various
pressures and incentives that influence states' commitment to international law, see Gona
Hathaway, Between Power and Prinile: An Integrated Theogy of International Law, 72 U Chi L Rev
(forthcoming).
57 It is generally understood that the customary international law embodied in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be derogated under circumstances such as a national
security emergency. See generally Anna-Lena Svensson-McCarthy, The International Law of Human
Rights and States of Excption (M Nijhoff 1998); The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Poltical Rights, reprinted in 7 Hum Rts Q 3, 12
(1985).
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This Comment's reconceptualized version of the doctrine simply eliminates
persistent objection as a circumstance that would justify derogating a customary
human rights norm. Other justifications for derogation remain intact. A state
simply would no longer be able to pick and choose which human rights laws it
will comply with unless derogation is justified by extenuating circumstances such
as a national security crisis.
Finally, one might wonder whether reformulation of the persistent objector
doctrine is really necessary to limit its reach. Perhaps jurists can simply limit the
doctrine's applicability to human rights law by setting a heavy evidentiary burden
for states wishing to invoke the doctrine. Indeed, at least one commentator has
suggested this solution.58 Unfortunately, raising the evidentiary burden simply
suggests that states need only to object louder and more frequently in order to
exempt themselves from human rights laws that are supposedly universal in
nature. In practice, such requirements might create disincentives for invoking
the persistent objector doctrine, thereby mitigating the erosion of human rights
law's universality. Nonetheless, such a solution is unsatisfying because the
conceptual tension between the persistent objector doctrine and universality still
remains. To truly resolve the tension between the persistent objector doctrine
and the underlying assumptions of human rights law, a wholesale
reconceptualization of the persistent objector doctrine is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the inherent tension between the human rights regime and the
persistent objector doctrine, evolving notions of consent in international law,
and reduced foreseeability concerns in international law, application of the
doctrine to human rights cases should be limited. As far as the human rights
context is concerned, the doctrine should be limited to cases in which
foreseeability is truly at issue. That is to say, the doctrine should only be honored
if there is not definitive and applicable case law regarding the human rights norm
at issue.
58 See Loschin, 2 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly at 167-68 (cited in note 13).
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